

LECTURE 1:  
INTRODUCTION

Jan Zouhar

Games and Decisions

# Course Information

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- *Lecturer:*           **Jan Zouhar**  
*e-mail:*                zouharj@vse.cz  
*web:*                    nb.vse.cz/~zouharj  
*office:*                 room NB431  
*office hours:*        Tue 16:15 – 17:45  
                              Fri 10:30 – 12:00
  
- *Supervisor:*       **Martin Dlouhý**  
*e-mail:*                dlouhy@vse.cz  
*web:*                    nb.vse.cz/~dlouhy  
*office:*                 room NB435  
*office hours:*        see InSIS

- *Course Requirements:*
  - **50** points: **assignments**
    - **5** problems, **10** points each
    - will appear on the website soon
    - due date: **December 11**
  - **50** points: **final written exam**
  
- *Grading scale:* standard ECTS points
  - **90 – 100** points: **excellent** (1)
  - **75 – 89** points: **very good** (2)
  - **60 – 74** points: **good** (3)
  - **0 – 59** points: **failed** (4)

- *Recommended reading:*
  - Lecture notes and presentations
  - MAŇAS, M., DLOUHÝ, M.: *Games and Economic Decisions*, Oeconomica, 2009
  - DLOUHÝ, M., FIALA, P.: *Úvod do teorie her*, VŠE, 2007 (*in Czech*)
  - Virtually any other book on game theory
  - Internet sources (e.g. [www.gametheory.net](http://www.gametheory.net), [www.wikipedia.org](http://www.wikipedia.org))

# Game 1: Guess $\frac{2}{3}$ of the Average

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- *Prize money: 20 Kč* for the winner
- *Rules:*
  - pick an integer between 0 and 100 and write it down onto a piece of paper
  - winner: the number closest to  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the average of all the guesses, without going over (i.e., the highest guess less than or equal to  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the average)
- *Empirical results:* winning guesses between **15** and **21**
- High guesses can mean two things:
  1. not understanding this is a strategic game
  2. believing the others do not understand this is a strategic game



# Game 2: An “Unfair” Auction

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- Compete in an *English auction* (“open-outcry” type) for a **100 Kč** banknote
- *Rules:*
  - starting price: **20 Kč**
  - buyers cry out increasing bids
  - the 100 Kč banknote sold to the highest bidder (at a price equal to his/her bid)
  - the **second-highest bid** is paid to the auctioneer **without any compensation**



*Empirical results:*

PAUL B. FARRELL: *Lizards, rats & the investor's primitive brain.*

# What Is a Game?

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- many types of games: board games, card games, video games, field games (e.g. football)
- we focus on games where:
  - there is more than one decision maker (*player*)
  - there is some choice of action where *strategy* matters
  - the game has one or more *outcomes*, e.g., someone wins, someone loses
  - the outcome depends on the strategies chosen by all players – there is *strategic interaction*
  - the players are *rational* (are aware of the strategic interaction and act accordingly)

→ not games of pure chance, such as Bingo

# Game vs. Decision Problem

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- *Example:* meal ordering: 4 people come to a restaurant
  1. every person pays for her own meal → *a decision problem*
  2. everyone agrees to split the bill evenly → *a game*



- when does a game become a decision problem?
  - players do not interact, no interdependencies between strategies
  - only 1 player (e.g., Solitaire)



# Strategy Interactions in Practice

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- *International trade:*
  - levels of imports, exports, prices depend not only on your own tariffs but also on tariffs of other countries
- *Production / market structure:*
  - price depends not only on your output but also on the output of your competitor
- *Labor:*
  - promotions like tournaments: your chances depend not only on your effort but also on efforts of others
- *Political economy:*
  - who/what I vote for depends on what everyone else is voting for
- *Public Goods:*
  - my benefits from contributing to a public good depend on what everyone else contributes

→ suitable application areas of **game theory**

# Game theory

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## Definitions:

*“...is a formal way to analyze interaction among a group of rational agents who behave strategically.”*

*“...can be defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between decision-makers.”*

*“...offers insights into economic, political, or any social situation that involves multiple participants with different goals.”*

## **a.k.a. :**

decision theory, conflict analysis, analysis of strategic behavior

# Game Theory – Descriptive vs. Normative Use


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- **normative approach:**
  - the analysis of rational behavior
  - goal = find the optimal, or “most rational” form of behavior (or sometimes, the winning strategy)
  - studies the way people *should decide*
- **descriptive approach:**
  - the analysis of the real-life behavior
    - sometimes, rational decisions are not obvious / people are not rational → normative approach gives us no clue (as in game 1)
  - goal = study the way people really behave (for predictions etc.)
  - studies the way people *decide in practice*
- **normativity** of a given game:
  - on average, 80% real-life players act according to the normative analysis → *the game is 80% normative*

# Game Theory – Historical Milestones

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- 1838: AUGUSTIN COURNOT, *Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth*
- 1913: ERNST ZERMELO – existence of winning strategies in games like chess
- 1920s and 1930s: works of ÉMILE BOREL and JOHN VON NEUMANN
- 1944: J. VON NEUMANN and OSKAR MORGENSTERN, *Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour*
- 1950s: works of JOHN NASH
  - (film: *A Beautiful Mind*)
- *Nobel prizes:*
  - 1994: NASH, HARSANYI, SELTEN
  - 2005: AUMANN, SCHELLING



↑ a film about John Nash      ↑  
→ John Nash (a recent photo)      →

# Game Theory – Applications

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- *Economics and business*
  - oligopolies, market structure, auctions, bargaining, fair division
- *Political science*
  - voting systems, coalition formation, public choice, war bargaining
- *Biology*
  - evolutionary game theory, signaling and communication games
- *Computer science and Logic*
  - multi-agent systems, computational complexity
- *Philosophy*
  - cognitive theories (common knowledge), ethics
- *Theology*
  - Pascal's gambit

# Game Theory – Terminology

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<b>Game theory</b>	<b>Reality</b>
<i>game</i>	conflict situation, decision situation
<i>player</i>	decision-maker, participant, individual, firm, political party
<i>strategy</i>	decision
<i>strategy space</i>	list of alternatives, feasible decisions
<i>payoff</i>	results, outcomes, consequences
<i>rational and intelligent</i>	maximizing utility or profit, knowing the rule of the game

# The elements of a Game

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- **players**
    - number of players (2+)
    - possibilities of cooperation
    - existence of coalitions
    - does nature/chance play a role?
    - perfect/imperfect information
  - **strategies, strategy spaces:**
    - discrete/continuous
    - *simultaneous* games (game 1) and *sequential* games (game 2)
  - **payoffs**
    - constant-sum games vs. variable-sum games
- different modeling techniques for different games



# Prisoner's Dilemma

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- 2 players (suspects, potential prisoners *A* and *B*)
- insufficient evidence for a conviction
- questioned separately, offered to cooperate with the police (*betray*)
- each player 2 strategies: *betray* or *remain silent*
- 4 possible outcomes:
  - *neither betrays*                      1 year sentence for both
  - *A betrays*                              *A* goes free, *B* **10** years
  - *B betrays*                              *B* goes free, *A* **10** years
  - *both betray*                            both **5** years
  
- what would you do if you were one them?

# Prisoner's Dilemma

(cont'd)

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- a game in **normal** (or **strategic**) form
- mathematical model: a **bimatrix game**


		Player B	
		Stay silent	Betray
Player A	A \ B		
	Stay silent	-1 , -1	-10 , 0
	Betray	0 , -10	-5 , -5

- strategy “stay silent” strictly dominated: no matter what  $B$  does,  $A$  is better off betraying him

*Real-life examples:*

- **Politics**

- arm race → *betrayal = military expansion*



- **Environment**

- CO<sub>2</sub> emissions → *betrayal = not cutting down on emissions*

- **Sport**

- steroid use → *betrayal = taking steroids*

- **Economics**

- advertising → *betrayal = advertising*

# Battle of the Sexes

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- young couple dating without means of coordination (i.e., batteries gone in the mobile phones)
- preliminary discussion: two options
  - *football game* (meet at 6 PM by the stadium)
  - *shopping* (6 PM at the entrance of a shopping mall)
- model
  - another *normal form game*
  - strategies: *football* and *shopping*
  - outcome quantification: *utility*




		Boy	
	Girl \ Boy	Football	Shopping
Girl	Football	2 ; 3	0 ; 0
	Shopping	1 ; 1	3 ; 2

- two “stable” solutions:  $(F,F)$  and  $(S,S)$   
→ *Nash equilibrium* (see lecture 2)

## Modification:

- the girl leaves earlier, decides where to go, manages to catch the boy on the phone at home, and tells him where she is
- a significant change: a *sequential* game (decisions go in turns)
- modeled as a game in **extensive form**
  - ▣ models use decision trees



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