0. Introduction

In the period between 1903 and 1905 Bertrand Russell held (at least) two theories of meaning, the first proposed in the Principles of Mathematics (POM), the second in On Denoting (OD). According to the first, every grammatically referential expression refers to an object, a "term" which occurs as a "constituent" in the "proposition" expressed; according to the second we should distinguish between genuine referential expressions (genuine names) and incomplete symbols: genuine names refer to constituents of propositions, whilst incomplete symbols don't occur as constituents and are substituted by a quantificational paraphrase in the logical form of the expressed propositions.

Many analyses have been devoted to the difference between these two theories, and indeed there are many important differences, but I would like to show that the two theories play a similar role in the general context of Russell's realist philosophy at the beginning of the 20th century; in particular, they are important tenets in the fight between Russell's realism and British idealism. It is possible to say that the two theories of meaning of the Principles and of On Denoting both answer (or try to answer) very important and difficult questions raised by the leading exponent of British idealism: F. H. Bradley. Bradley held logical and metaphysical arguments, taken from his theory of object individuation, which seemed to undermine the very possibility of pluralism through the negation of the very possibility of reference to individual things. Russell's theories of meaning and individuation (that of Principles and that of On Denoting) offer, on the contrary, an analysis of reference which is perfectly compatible with pluralism (or perhaps that strongly supports pluralism). In this sense the analysis of Bradley's theory of object individuation can add, I believe, some more elements to a fuller understanding of the philosophical significance of Russell's theories of meaning.

The paper will be divided in two parts. In the first one I shall present Russell's two theories of meaning, developed in the Principles of Mathematics and in On Denoting.

(My presentation will be rather sketchy as Russell's ideas are well known: I will not treat POM theory of denotation and I will take for granted the knowledge of Russell's theory of description).

next page

  contents
 

In the second part of my paper I shall consider Bradley's theory of reference from which I shall extract a holistic account of meaning that I shall compare with Russell's theories of reference.

1. Russell's first two theories of Meaning

1.1. The Principles of Mathematics

In the Principles of Mathematics, Russell describes a proposition as a complex of entities called "terms", connected to each-other by "external relations", that is relations that exist in se, independently of the terms which they connect. This is a rather realist account of proposition:

A proposition, unless it happens to be linguistic, does not itself contain words: it contains the entities indicated by words (POM, § 51, p.47).

Furthermore, the theory of meaning related to this view of proposition is also realist:

Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or false proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term. This then, is the widest word in the philosophical vocabulary. […] Every term has being, i.e. is in some sense. A man, a moment, a number, a class, a relation, a chimaera, or anything else that can be mentioned, is sure to be a term: and to deny that such and such a thing is a term must always be false. (POM, § 47, p.43)

So, according to this view, "anything that can be mentioned" is a term; using "to name" in a broad sense, anything that can be named is a term (Russell speaks of "indication", instead of naming); that is anything that can be named has a kind of being (which Russell distinguish from existence -actuality. Since the distinction is not relevant for logic and for the theory of meaning, at least in the Principles, we will not take it into account.).

Any expression that can work as a grammatical subject in a sentence "indicates" an entity, that is a term which occurs as a constituent of the proposition expressed by the sentence. And this holds for Donald Duck as for Reagan, for the present King of France as for the present Queen of England. (I remember that there is another sense of "meaning" related to the theory of denotation of POM that we are not taking into account).

Apart from the problem of denotation (which requires a separate analysis) there is no difference between grammatical and logical form as far as the lexical items of language are concerned: every

previous page

next page

  contents
 

expression that can occur as a grammatical subject in a sentence, indicates (means) an entity that can occur as a logical subject of a proposition.

Language, we can say, is a transparent medium. And this in Russell's theory has a strong anti-idealistic connotation. The articulation of sentences (which are also the common sense articulations of the pluralistic understanding of the world) simply shows the logical and ontological articulations of propositions. Or better: we can grasp the pluralistic articulation of being through the articulations of language (which in this sense is a transparent medium).

1.2. On Denoting, descriptions and direct reference

In 1905 Russell dramatically abandoned his previous theory. There are many reasons for which Russell was not satisfied by his early analysis of meaning and reference. I am not discussing the details of Russell's new position.

(I only wish to stress the fact that the different attitude towards the ontological implications of a referential interpretation of words mentioning unicorns, golden mountains, round squares, and so on was motivated by Russell's logical and mathematical considerations, as well as by peculiar problems in the analysis of meaning.)

In any case, as everybody knows, the solution to these difficulties is found in the distinction between genuine names and incomplete symbols.

This theory can be stated as follows: definite descriptions are only apparently referential. They don't have meaning in isolation, that is, their denotation does not occur as constituent in the propositions expressed by the sentence in which the descriptions occur. These propositions, on the contrary, contain (the meanings of) the quantificational paraphrases of the descriptions.

Proper names have a meaning in isolation, that is the named object; for them the old maxim of the Principles holds, that the meaning of an expression is its reference. The fact that the meaning of a proper names is simply the named object, shows that this is a paradigmatic case of direct reference. No conceptual qualification of the referent is required. The name is only a mark to pick up its referent. It is linked with his referent by the relation of acquaintance: we have a direct cognitive knowledge of certain entities of which we are "aware", which are "presented to our mind", and this cognitive relation allows us to use the name to pick up its nominatum.

As a result, many expressions that from a grammatical point of view look as if they were referential, are in reality descriptive in character and consequently, incomplete symbols: expressions that have no meaning in isolation from the context of the sentence in which they occur. Language is no longer a transparent medium.

previous page

next page

  contents
 

2. Bradley on Object Individuation

2.1 Meaning and Object Individuation

I shall take into account the theses proposed by Bradley in his Principles of Logic (1883) and in Appearance and Reality (1893) (two books that Russell knew very well). I shall also refer to the Essays on Truth and Reality (1914).

Bradley's analysis of reference is part of a general strategy against the empirist notion of fact, and particularly against the possibility of a true judgement of sense. A judgement of sense, Bradley maintains, must attribute a property to a particular object. But in order to do so we must pick up the object in question¹. This leads us to the problem of reference.

In fact Bradley advocates something like an indeterminacy thesis:² it is impossible to refer to a particular object because our only means of individuations are general, and this implies that what we really pick up is not a single object but rather a class of objects (a "sort" of things, says Bradley).

Let us consider the case of a description, like "the house", or "last Tuesday" (I use the word "description" in a broad sense to denote any expression which gives its referent through a qualitative characterization). If I say: "It rained last Tuesday" or "The house is yellow", the content of my judgement will be universal for Bradley.

The event you describe is a single occurrence, but what you say of it will do just as well for any number of events, imaginary or real. (Principles of Logic, b. I, p. 63).

In other words the description that we decide to apply to an intended object, "may easily apply to many other objects as well". Of course we could try to get to a more precise description, but "for every descriptive expression that we use or might use, there could be other objects to which it would apply" (Wollheim [1959], pp.52-53).

Anthony Manser, in his Bradley's Logic, explains the situation as follows:

The problem with […] sensory judgements is that they do not indicate a unique event, for the words used are general. […] These judgement purport to give the unique results of a perceptual contact with the world, but they fail to do so. Nor will the addition of further indicators help, for however many we add, we are still faced with a judgement that could be uttered in more than one context. (Manser, 1983, p.110)

So far we have discussed the case of descriptive expressions, where the individuation of the referred object depends on a qualitative characterization, but what about proper names? Why not take them as simply picking up their nominata? Manser writes:

previous page

next page

  contents
 

What is needed to solve the problem [of the indeterminacy of reference] is an "Archimedean point" which serves to anchor the series [of descriptions] in reality. This cannot be given by another word or idea, because is still another thing of the same kind. The only device which would do this is a Russellian "logical proper name" which does serve to fill the gap between language and the world, or thought and reality. (Manser, 1983, p. 111.)

In his Logic Bradley argues that no such kind of expression can exist and critics John Stuart Mill's theory that the meaning of a name can be identified with its denotation:

There is a curious illusion, now widely spread, on the subject of proper names. We find it laid down that a proper names has not got connotation, or, to use the more common technical term, it has no intension. In ordinary language it stands for something but it does not mean anything. (Principles of Logic,.b. I, p. 59.)

Here Bradley seems to attempt a preventive confutation of Russell's theory of naming:

If there is an idea conveyed by the name, whenever it is used, then it surely means something, or, in the language which pleased you, it must be "connotative". But if, on the other hand, it conveys no idea, it would appear to be some kind of interjection. (Principles of Logic, b.I, pp. 59-60)

So a name:

If it did not to some extent get to mean the thing, it never could get to stand for for it at all. […] What connection, I would ask, would be left between the bare name and the thing it stand for, if every one of [the] ideas [associated to the name] were removed? All would vanish together. (Principles of Logic, b.I, p. 60)

To conclude, in Bradley's analysis of reference, both names and descriptions must be considered as descriptive expressions (in our local use of the term).

To this we must add that demonstratives too are taken by Bradley to be "universal"³. The general conclusion is that no individual act of reference is possible; that we are never speaking of an individual, but always of a sort, or a kind of things; that we never mention individual things but only "characters", or general aspects. So we cannot have true judgements of sense:

The judgement will be true of any case whatsoever of a certain sort; but, if so, it cannot true of the reality; for that is unique and is a fact, not a sort. (Principles of Logic, b.I, pp.49-50)

previous page

next page

  contents
 

From the general character of our ideas Bradley conclude the impossibility of genuine individual judgement and reference:

Ideas are universal, and, no matter what it is what we try to say and dimly mean, what we really express and succeed in asserting, is nothing individual. (Principles of Logic, b.I, p. 49)

This leads to a holistic view of meaning and reality, because any attempt to a definite individuation leads to a further specification of the referred thing, but the (final) truth lies only in the understanding of the totality (or the Absolute). As Bradley writes in his Essays on Truth and Reality (1914):

Your meaning is always on demand to be made explicit and stated intelligibly within the judgement (p. 235)

2.2. Reference and Object Individuation

Using a contemporary terminology, we can say that at the root of Bradley's theory of reference there is the belief that a judgement must relate to reality "in virtue of its explicit content alone, so that an attempt to relate a judgement uniquely to one single part of reality by the use of" descriptions, demonstrative expressions or Russellian names "is beside the point."⁴

Hilary Putnam (in 1975) described the traditional theories of meaning as saying that the meanings of our words must be in our heads: in this sense, Bradley holds a very articulated and powerful version of a traditional theory. (And in this very sense, Russell's realist theory of proposition in POM can be seen as a radically alternative approach. However, the comparison is not so easy, because of the peculiar character of Russellian propositions, which are explicitly conceived as something to which the problem of meaning -- in the "psychological" sense -- does not apply.)

In any case, Bradley argued (a) that direct reference is impossible and (b) that indirect reference gives no individuation of particulars. This leads him to the thesis that our "meanings" are "always on demand to be made explicit", and more generally, that no individual can be the (logical) subject of a self contained judgement.]

If this is true, what then are the relations that we can see between Bradley's views and Russell's analysis of meaning? (We are looking for theoretical connections, not historical ones.)

Broadly speaking, we can say that Russell's analysis of meaning can avoid Bradley's indeterminacy thesis because it denies one of the central premisses of Bradley's view: the idea that meaning is

previous page

next page

  contents
 

something in the heads of the speakers, that a judgement must relate to reality "in virtue of its explicit content alone" (as Holdcroft says).

This is clear in the approach of On Denoting: the meaning of a genuine name is its reference, that is an object and not a concept (like Frege's Sinn). And this object can be individuated by acquaintance, i.e. it is given by a direct reference relation: something that simply picks up the object of our awareness, without the help of any conceptual characterization.

This throws a new light on the relation of acquaintance, which shows its anti-idealistic character. In this connection we could also notice that one of Russell's most objectionable epistemological theses, the ideas that we are acquainted with sense data and not with physical objects, can (also) be explained by the fact that physical objects are objects of a certain kind, and this might lead to a Bradleian class of objections against their possibility to be known by acquaintance. On the contrary sense data look exactly like the sorts of things that are not put into question by Bradley's arguments.

In the Principles, adopting a realist view of proposition together with a "transparent" view of language, Russell can simply consider Bradley's theses on the indeterminacy of reference either as irrelevant or as misleading. (I still ignore the case of denotation).

If meanings are to be thought of as "mental" as a content of someone's mind, then there is no place for meaning in the propositions, which are complexes of entities, not of words. In this sense, the phenomenon of meaning is not relevant for logic. Logic studies inferential relations between propositions and we don't have to bother with language studying proposition, because the linguistic structure that expresses a proposition (in the main) simply shows the structure of the proposition. The psychological problems of individuation -that is the "ideas" that single speakers associate with their words- have no interest for logical analysis. (In this sense Russell in the Principles does not answer Bradley's linguistic objections to pluralism: he simply takes for granted that they are not relevant for logic -- and ontology.)⁵

So, if we look at the POM approach from this point of view, we can say that, in its general character, it does not change, after On Denoting, as much as we are inclined to think.

Of course, as we have seen, the rejection of the thesis of the correspondence between grammatical form and logical form, that is the these of the transparence of language, forced Russell to take the problem of reference as central for his logic. But the kind of theory of reference Russell looked for had in common with the previous Principles' position the idea that genuine names, that is, expressions which stand for constituents of propositions, don't give their referents by means of conceptual characterization. They have no meaning -in the sense of Bradleian "content" or Fregean "Sinn "; they simply are marks for the named object.

In this sense, Russell's theory of direct reference, and the principle of acquaintance can be seen as the basic tenets of a radical alternative to Bradley's views; an alternative perfectly compatible -- from Russell's point of view, of course -- with a pluralistic account of meaning and reality.

previous page

next page

  contents
 

Conclusions

Bradley and Russell present two alternative analysis of meaning, perhaps two alternative research programs for the analysis of a set of phenomena that we can label "the problem of meaning -- or reference, or object individuation".

From the point of view of Russell's theory of direct reference, or, more generally from the point of view of Russell's realist and pluralistic attitude towards propositions (and ontology), Bradley's mistake is to take for granted that the only way in which a word can have a meaning is by association with a conceptual content -- and, conversely, that a proposition is something necessarily mental.

But the sense of Russell's (and Moore's) "revolt into pluralism" is that this is not obvious. Russell's realist attitudes towards meaning in both his two (first) theories, is only an aspect of his general realist attitudes.

The phenomenon of meaning is a complex one. We can choose to deal with it through the identification of the meaning of a word with a kind of entities that can be grasped by the speaker's mind. Apart from many fundamental differences⁶, this is Frege's and Bradley's strategy. If we choose this view and we want to prevent Bradley's holistic conclusions, we have to avoid the indeterminacy of sense advocated by Bradley. I don't know whether Frege's approach can deal with these difficulties. If it can, I guess, it must admit a form of demonstrative sense (John Perry, Gareth Evans, Michael Dummett and many others raised this question, but it is impossible to discuss it now).

An alternative view, which is Russell' view, is to explain the phenomenon of meaning by the identification of meaning and reference. Both in the POM and in OD the meaning of a genuine referential expression is an entity which occur as a constituent in the expressed proposition. Naturally this implies that either the class of genuine referential expression has to be limited in some way, or we must accept an ontology without restrictions.

The latter solution, proposed in the Principles, was rejected by Russell, for logical, mathematical and ontological reasons, and the second one required the invention of the theory of descriptions and more generally of the development of the theory of incomplete symbols.

They are two rather different theories. But if we look at them from a historical point of view, we can perhaps see a Russellian and not a Hegelian example of "identity in difference".

previous page

next page

  contents
 

References

Bradley F.H. [1883] Principles of Logic, Oxford 1883, sec. ed.cit. Oxford Univ. Press, London 1922.

Bradley F.H. [1893] Appearance and Reality, Oxford 1893, sec. ed. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1897.

Bradley F.H. [1914] Essays on Truth and Reality, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1914.

Frege G. [1892] Über Sinn und Bedeutung, "Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik", 100, pp.25-50.

Dummett M. [1981a] Frege. Philosophy of Language, sec.ed., Duckworth, London 1981.

Evans G. [1982] The Varieties of Reference, (ed. J. Mc Dowell), Clarendon Press, Oxford; Oxford University. Press, New York 1982.

Holdcroft D. [1984] Holism and Truth, in Manser & Stock [1984], pp.191-209.

Manser A. [1983] Bradley's Logic, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1983.

Manser A. [1984] Bradley and Frege, in Manser & Stock [1984], pp.303-317.

Passmore J. [1966] A Hundred Years of Philosophy, Duckworh 1957 & 1966, repr.Penguin Books, Harmondsworht 1968.

Putnam H. [1975] The Meaning of "Meaning", repr. in Id Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers, Vol.2 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge1975

Russell B. [1903]-POM Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge at the University Press, 1903; sec.ed. 1937.

Russell B. [1905]-OD On Denoting, "Mind", n.s., 14 (1905), pp. 479-493; rist. in Id. Logic and Knowledge, (ed.C.A.Marsh), Allen and Unwin, London 1956, pp. 41-56.

Stock G. [1984] Bradley Theory of Judgement, in Manser e Stock [1984], pp.131-154.

Wollheim R. [1959] F.H.Bradley, Penguin Books, Harmondsworht 1959.

Notes

*.     This is the text of a paper delivered at the Workshop on "Object, Identity and Identification"; Prague, 9-11, 4, 1990. Even if I did not find necessary to introduced any change to the fundamental ideas expressed in it, I would like to refer to further development of my research on the subject, that I published later, and particularly to Il Realismo analitico, Logica, ontologia a significato in Russell, Guerini a Associati, Milano (I) 1992.

1. Cf.Wollheim, 1959: pp. 49 ff. for a clear statement of these ideas. Cf. also Passmore 1966, pp. 60 ff.

2. Cf. Holdcroft, 1984 and Stock, 1984 for detailed analysis of the issue.

3. "[…] ideally fixed "this" becomes an universal among other universals." (Principles of Logic, b. I, p.67).

4. Holdcroft, 1984, p. 195.

5. We must admit that there is a different sense of "meaning", in which a denoting concept like a man has a meaning relevant for logic, but, this is a sense of meaning which concerns only denoting concept, and the relation of denotation has nothing to do with the "psychological" problem of individuation, for it is a relation between non-linguistic entities. So Russell could write: "When meaning is thus understood [meaning in the sense of denotation], the entity indicated by John does not have meaning, as Mr Bradley contends" (POM, § 51, p.47). And so he goes on: "The confusion is largely due, I believe, to the notion that words occur in propositions, which in turn is due to the notion that proposition are essentially mental, and are to be identified with cognitions." (POM, § 51, p. 47)

6. The most important of which is the objectitve, mind-independent, platonistic account that Frege gave of his "senses". Cf. Holdcroft 1984, pp. 133 ff.

previous page

  contents