E-LOGOS
ELECTRONIC
JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY
ISSN
1211-0442
-----------------------------------------------------------
MORS IMMORTALIS
(The problem of death
in Spinoza's philosophy)
by
Martin Hemelík
ABSTRACT:
Death and dying
- these are
very important philosophical
problems. Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza who ranks among the rationalists of the XVIIth century, solves the problem of
death in the framework of his ontological schedule. The
author summarizes the
basic elements of Spinoza's solution: Death can play the
role of evil only for such kind of
people which is not able of higher forms of understanding, i.e. only for
people who are called "homines carnales" by
Spinoza; for people
whom Spinoza called "homines sapientes", death cannot play
this role. On the contrary, homo
sapiens is able to overcome death
because he understands himself and the necessity of things and God.
Keywords: Spinoza - death - dying
- good - evil - "homo carnalis" - "homo
sapiens"
I.
At first sight,
the motive of
death in Spinoza's philosophy does
not seem to
be very important
and interesting; Spinoza does
not deal explicitly with this motive. In
his main work
"Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata", the motive of
death is only marginal. Why then this theme?
Nevertheless, the reasons for an inquiry of this theme can be found very
easily. First of all, Spinoza's philosophy is an ethical doctrine of the
right human way to liberty, happiness and
bliss (beatitudo). (In
Spinoza, liberty, happiness and
bliss are three dimensions of the ultimate end of human life.) With
respect to this end, death would be considered as a
very serious or even insuperable
hindrance. In our everyday experience, dying and death are given in a
very pressing way and this concerns all
living beings and primarily ourselves.
Spinoza as a philosopher who
examines the human way
to liberty, happiness
and bliss cannot therefore leave out of these
problems.
Moreover, the question of
dying and death is also connected very closely with
the ethical problem of good and evil.
In his Ethica, Spinoza looks into this problem very carefully and this
is why I think that in the
framework of these considerations it
is possible to
grasp the basic features of Spinoza's treatment of the question of
death.
II.
Max Scheler called Spinoza
(as well as G. W. Leibniz) "the philosopher of metaphysical optimism" because - according to Schelerøs opinion - he denied the
ontological validity of suffering to such
an extent that his philosophy can be held for a metaphysical justification of evil in the world.(1) In my
view, this opinion seems to be doubtful. Letøs examine this
"justification of evil" in Spinozism.
As early as in his Short Treatise that
originated about 1660 Spinoza expresses
an unequivocal judgement concerning the
above mentioned problem: "Daraus
folgt also - wie oben - dass gut und schlecht keine Dinge oder Handlungen
sind, die in der
Natur sich finden."(2) In Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata it is formulated in a more explicite way: "With regard to good and evil these terms
indicate nothing positive in things considered in themselves, nor are they
anything else than modes of thought, or notions which we form from the comparison of one thing with another. For one and the same thing may
at the same time be both good and evil or
indifferent."(3) In the
definitions of Part IV of Ethica there can
be found an exact specification of the terms of good and evil: "By good, I understand that
which we certainly know is useful
to us. By evil, on the contrary, I understand that which we certainly know hinders us from possesing
anything that is good."(4)
From
Spinozaøs point of view, good and
evil are not important from the
ontological point of view. They have no
relevance to the ontological order
of all being. Accordingly, their importance can be found only in relation to our human nature. It must be so because the ontological basis for all - God
(Deus) - has no such characterizations.
God (the Absolute) is neither good nor
bad. Inasmuch as all is in God and God is
the immanent cause of all, no existing thing is good or bad in itself.
Thus, there is no reason for speaking
about "justifying of
evil" in Schelerian sense. In Spinoza, nobody and nothing is
guilty.
However, the problem of the justification
of evil can be treated in
another way. If Spinoza
understands evil as what hinders us from possesing anything that is good, then it is obvious that the very fact of the existence of this hindrance can be understood as evil. Anything (any
being) arises necessarily from
the essence of God. The fact that something is
evil for us,
must result somehow from the general
order of nature or have its reason and cause in God. In this way, the existence of evil would be based upon the entire ontological
schedule of being.
This consideration seems to oscillate between clarity and confusedness. To avoid this confusedness, we should try to
understand again Spinoza's
approach to human condition. Good and evil
cannot be found in things as considered in themselves.
Good and evil are constituted in the relations between our
nature and these
things. Nevertheless, our existence, the existence of things and,
consequently, our contacts with things, in
which things' goodness and badness are constituted, this all belongs to the general order of nature
and has an objective and even the
absolute basis. In Spinoza, human
evaluation of things as good
and bad takes place also
in "the empire
of necessity". A
full understanding of things and their characters (good and evil) is not
derived solely from things themselves,
but also from our and their
position within the
general order. For Spinoza, the idea of the justification of evil in the world would be
the same as if the triangle were justified by the fact that the sum of its three angles is two right angles. In accordance
with Spinoza, this
world is not the best world, but
it is the only possible world because it is the necessary world. Only in
this meaning we can understand the problem of Spinoza's justification of evil
in the world. There is no other
possibility.
Since good and evil are notions
which are constituted in the relations
of things to our human nature,
we are not able to aim at the
elimination of evil. We cannot deny our
nature. The general order of nature is
incorrigible. We can "humiliate" the evil in such a way that the suffering which results
from the existence of evil is compensated for our ability to understand evil and for
our actions which are led by this
understanding. This is the hard
core of Spinozaøs ethical doctrine
as well as
the basic framework of our considerations
about the question of the death in Spinozism.
III.
Death and dying - these are the examples of evil in the world. This
is a common opinion.(5) Death
is often considered as
the absolute or
supreme evil. Is it the supreme evil also for Spinoza?
Spinoza's doctrine implies a
positive answer to this question even
though we cannot
find it in his work in explicit form. Let's
start a reconstruction of this answer in
terms of the considerations which are contained in Part III, IV and V of
Ethica ordine geometrico
demonstrata. We can use the
following formulation of Spinoza:
"Nothing can be evil through that
which it possesses in common with our nature, but in
so far as a thing is
evil to us is it contrary to us."(6) Our nature (to say nothing of our basic determination which consists in our being a mode of
the attribute of extensity as well as a mode of the attribute of thinking)
is constituted by "the effort to perservere in its being"(7) and on
the other hand "the effort by
which we endeavour to achieve
the life of
wise man" , i.e. the possibility
to become the "homo sapiens" really.(8)
Has death anything common with our
nature? Of course it has not. Since death is at variance with our nature, it
must be evil for us. If death is evil
for us, it hinders us from possesing anything
that is good. But death belongs to the "general order of
nature", i.e. it is necesary. How does Spinoza come to terms
with this situation?
In Spinoza's philosophy, it is possible to discern two attempts to this
problem, which are connected very
closely. The first attempt
has led to
the fact that Spinoza's philosophy is sometimes characterized as a
kind of Stoic ethical doctrine. 67.
proposition of Part IV says: " A
free man thinks of nothing less than of
death, and his wisdom is not a meditation upon death but upon life."(9) The scholion of 39.proposition of Part
V says: "Inasmuch as human bodies are fit many
things, we cannot doubt the possibility of their possessing such
a nature that they may be
related to minds which have a large
knowledge of themselves and of God and
whose greatest or principal part is
eternal, so that they scarcely for death."(10)
These
ideas are very similar to the
ideas of Stoic philosopher Epicurus. Like the Stoic philosopher,
Spinoza seems to endeavour at avoiding
human anxiety in a similarly simple and
clever way: 'If we are here,
death is not here and, on the
contrary, when death is here, so
we are not here.' Such ideas can be found also in other Greek and Roman philosophers.
It
is necessary to
become aware of
the following important
circumstance: Spinoza derives
the main parts of his ethical doctrine
from the theory of "conatu",
i.e. from the idea that the human "essentia actualis" is the
conscious instinct of self-preservation. Spinoza's
refusal of "thinking upon
death" and his emphasizing of
"thinking upon life" is adequate to
the human "essentia actualis". Spinoza does not imitate the
Stoic philosophy, he is original.
The
essence of man is related first of all to the perservation
of existence. It is not "being to death". The need of "thinking upon life" as
well as the refusal of "thinking
upon death" can be regarded as
the evidence of man's ontological constitution.
In
the second attempt which can be found
in Spinoza's philosophy, the problem
of death is
treated in another context. Namely,
the question of death is always
connected with the idea of the immortality of soul. Spinoza says in his Short Treatise: "Dabei haben wir nun bemerkt, dass die Seele entweder mit dem Krper, dessen Vorstellung sie ist, oder mit
Gott, ohne welchen
sie weder bestehen
noch begriffen werden kann,
vereinigt werden mag, woraus man leicht sehen kann,
1. dass,
wenn sie mit dem Krper allein
vereinigt ist und dieser vergeht, sie dann auch untergehen muss, denn wenn sie den
Krper, welcher die
Grundlage ihrer Liebe ist, entbehrt,
muss sie damit auch zunichte gehen;
2. wenn sie aber mit etwas anderem, das unvernderlich ist
und bleibt, sich vereinigt, wird sie dann im Gegenteil auch mit
demselben unvernderlich bleiben
mssen. Denn wodurch sollte es mglich sein, dass sie vernichtet werden knnte? Nicht
durch sich selbst; denn so wenig als sie aus sich selbst zu sein
damals anfangen konnte, als sie noch nicht war, ebensowenig kann sie
auch, wenn sie nun ist, sich entweder verndern oder vergehen. So dass
dasjenige, welches allein die Ursache
ihres Sein, ist, darum auch, wenn dies vergeht, die Ursache ihres
Nichtsein sein muss, weil es sich selbst
verndert oder
vergeht."(11) Similar ideas
can be read in Part V of Ethica, 23. proposition: "The human mind cannot be absolutely
destroyed with the body, but something of it
remains which is
eternal."(12) And also 39. proposition: "He
who possesses a
body fit for many things possesses
a mind of which the
greatest part is eternal".(13)
What does it mean? Is Spinoza an adherent
of the idea of immortal soul?
Does he think
that only our body is mortal?
Let's inquire this difficult problem.
It is necessary to have in mind that in
Spinoza, man is the exceptional being
whose existence occurs
in two connections. Man functions as a whole in relation to other beings and,
simultaneously, he is a part of a
higher whole, i.e. a part of the
Universe. This view is very significant
for Spinoza's philosophy.
From this point of view it is not surprising that only man's body is
mortal; it should be added that also those modes of mind, which
are connected to body (i.e. imaginatio) are
mortal. On the
contrary, the part
of mind called intellect
(intellectus or ratio) as well as the one called "scientia
intuitiva" are eternal because
they are the parts of "the infinite
intellect of God".(14) According to Spinoza, the genuine
knowledge, i.e. the
understanding of the Universe and
of the basic ontological schedule is generated just in these
parts; this is also the place where the boundary
between man and
God disappears. Thus, the intellectus and scientia intuitiva are the forms
of our participation in the
eternal and absolute
God-substance. Spinoza uses here
the famous concept
of the "amor Dei intellectualis", which
expresses a kind
of the partial identification of
man and God. As Spinoza puts it, "hence it follows that God, in so
far as He loves Himself, loves man, and
consequently that the love of God towards man and the intellectual love
of the mind towards God are one and the same thing."(15)
Therefore it is not possible to say
that the idea of immortal soul
plays an important
role in Spinoza. The eternality of the intellectual and intuitive parts of mind consists in
the fact that
they are able
to identify themselves with the
intellect of God-substance.
IV.
Let's try to sum up.
From Spinoza's point of view, death is only a relative evil, namely
in the relation to our nature; it
hinders or can hinder the
achievement of right life as controlled
by our intellect. When does death
become this evil?
Death can play the role of evil only for
men who lack the higher forms of understanding, i.e. only for men who are called "homines carnales" in Spinoza.
Homo carnalis is a sensuous man
who is dragged by his passions and (confused) imaginations. He is a passive being and this is why he is not
able of really acting (in the sense of Spinoza's term agere).
For such a man, death is
the absolute evil. Homo carnalis
understands neither his
own nature nor
the necessity of things nor God. Therefore he is afraid of death and is
unable to save himself from dealing continuously with the painful idea of
death. Instead of living his life in its fulness, he steadily suffers.
For such kind of man, which is called in Spinoza "homo sapiens",
death cannot play the role of evil because this man
"is scarcely ever
moved in his
mind, but, being conscious by a certain eternal
necessity of himself, of God, and of
things, never ceases to be,
and always enjoys true peace of
soul."(16) He lives
the right life,
he is controlled by intellect and the main part of his mind is becoming eternal. Homo sapiens is able to overcome death. This
is the way in which Spinoza solves the problem of death in his philosophy.
NOTES
AND REFERENCES
1) M. Scheler:
Rad lasky (Ordo
amoris - in
Czech), Praha 1971, p. 123.
2) B. Spinoza: Kurzgefasste Abhandlung vom
Gott, dem Mensch und dessen Glck, Leipzig 1874, p. 40.
3) B.
Spinoza: Ethics, transl.
by W. H. White, Chicago 1952, p. 423.
4) Ibid.,
p.424.
5) See
for example C. Tresmontant: Teodicea,
in: Host (The Guest - in Czech, a journal published in Brno), 7/91.
6) B.
Spinoza: Ethics, Chicago 1952, p. 432
7) Ibid.,
p. 399.
8) Ibid.,
p. 463.
9) Ibid.,
p. 444.
10) Ibid.,
p. 462.
11) B.
Spinoza: Kurzgefasste Abhandlung..., p.
99.
12) B.
Spinoza: Ethics, Chicago 1952, p. 458.
13) Ibid.,
p. 462.
14) Ibid.,
p. 377.
15) Ibid.,
p. 461.
(c)
Martin Hemelik
Dept.
Philosophy
The
University of Economics
W.
Churchilla 4,
Prague
3, 130 00,
Czech
Republic