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Martin Hemelik:
DE REPERTORE ENTIS
(
On Spinoza’s conception of being)
Keywords: Ontological philosophy - Spinoza -
being - God - human mind _____________________________________________________________
We have here an interest
in the Spinoza’s conception of being.
There are at least two reasons for the inquiry on this conception: In the
first place the problem (or the question) of being is
representing the most
important element in
every philosophical system and
secondly Baruch Spinoza tried to solve the difficulties involved in this
problem in original
a remarkable way. Although many
contemporary philosophers presume that
the conception of being does not have
to be solved, because it is even no problem from their angle of vision, I suppose that this problem is not resolved up to this time and the philosophy must go
inquire on it.
The Spinoza’s solution
may be very inspiring.
Many
interpreters and commentators
of spinozism remarked that Spinoza
set up the ontological basis of his philosophy rather early when
he studied and explained the philosophy of R.Descartes. The
principles of the Cartesian
philosophy that he expounded
for his pupil
were the great
source of Spinoza’s thought, but to present Spinoza primarily as a sort of apostolic succesor of
Descartes is misleading.
Young
Dutch philosopher summarized
the results of his intellectual effort
in the "Renati des Cartes Principia philosophiae more geometrico
demonstrata per Benedicti de Spinoza Amstelodamensem" (Principles
of the Cartesian philosophy) to which he
added the appendix
called "Cogitata Metaphysica" (Metaphysical Thought). This appendix indicating
convicely the independence
of Spinoza’s thought
contains philosopher’s own ideas
and conceptions. From this it follows that this work and particularly the text of appendix might be used
as our field of inquire.
Let’s beginn to inquiry so that we could try to understand the sense
and meaning of
spinozistic being. What
sort of ontological philosophy
does Spinoza offer
in the Cogitata Metaphysica ? In this work, as he says1), he wanted to elucidate "the
dark places" of metaphysical considerations. What "dark places"
(circa obscuriora) does Spinoza mean
? He beginns with the concept of being. From this
it is clear that this concept is dark. Why, however, just
this concept ? So as to understand the Spinoza’s reason let’s give
an example. We must know the nature of parabola in order that we
could know the
nature of its
orderly applications. Analogously,
if we were ignorant of the
nature of being as such, it would be impossible to know the nature of being things.
In one’s effort to understand the nature of being what means to understand first of all the sense of
the concept of being we must
return to its darkness and unclearness caused by host of various
philosophical explications. Unless we shall do it the ontological will keep in
the dark backround and we shall not be
able to understand.
Primarily Dutch philosopher inspired
with mathematical methods furnishs
the definition of
the concept of
being (definitio entis): "Incipiamus igitur ab ente, per quod
intelligo id omne, quod, quum clare
et distincte percipitur,
necessario existere vel ad
minimum posse existere
reperimus."2) I am conviced
that the verb
"reperire" ("Reperimus" is the first person of plural in simple present tense.) is the most important word
of this definition. There are many meanings of this latin verb: to find something, to find something lost, to find out, to search out,
to think of, to descry, to espy etc. To reconstruct what meaning was in
Spinoza’s mind first of all is very difficult and only hypothetical. Nevertheless let’s try consider
the possibilities: If we find something as existing or
potent to exist, we find it as being.
It is possible to say, too: we search out something being just as existing or potent to exist. Even it could be said:
we think of something as being
as long as it exists or is
potent to exist.
I
suppose that the
meaning germaned to
the Spinoza’s definition is
"to find". Human mind (reason) is able to find something
such a kind of being. Now, however, a question turns up: How are
we able to do it ?
On what and how is based our ability of such
finding ? My answer goes like
this: Finding mentioned by Spinoza
is not only finding of anything,
but it is finding of something just as
being. We are able to find such point (or characteristic)
of something, because we
are alone being ! Our active and finding mind is being. Moreover from this it follows that the process of finding is actually meeting. The mind as
thinking thing, which
is being, meets
with some non-thinking thing,
which is being too. Thus being hidden
in the mind (or presented in the mind)
meets with something what exists or
is potent to
exist out of
mind. Therefore true being, i.e.being as being,
is found or thought or researched just in this meeting.
How do we understand it ? It could seem
the human mind is held by
Spinoza as the creator of
being. This may be simple enough, but it is misleading. In the spinozistic sense is better to say:
"The creators" or "the
inventors" or "the producents" of being are two:
the God as absolute Being (ens
absolutum) and human mind (mens)
or reason (intellectus). Though Spinoza
wrote probably never this sentence, I
am conviced that it consists in the fundamentals of his ontological ethics.
I will attempt to give the reasons for this interpretation of Spinoza’s definiton of being.
The primary task in the
discussion before us is to examine the Spinoza’s treatment of the nature of our finding
something just as being. This finding
occurs within the framework of clear and distinct knowledge. The
clear and distinct knowledge, for Spinoza, must be considered as the effect of reason and also as a top act of human active mind. Our mind, however, products and contains many acts. If
we are thinking, our mind is full and many various ideas present in it. These ideas
are imaginary being, then they
are beings of thought. Does it
follow from this that all acts of our mind
have the nature of solely
mental being ? Supposing yes so
they would be only something thought and we could find something as being only as something thought. All our ideas, deductions, considerations etc. would
be closed in the area of our
mind. Philosophical said
they would be only and solely immanent being
of mind. Is it like this ? May
be all our knowledge and finding of
being only our invention or products ? Is
it really like this ? These are
very difficult and rending questions
whose urgency Spinoza appreciated good.
Let’s turn our attention to his answers.
In the second paragraph of Metaphysical Thought
Spinoza affirms and
demonstrates3) that certain contains
of our mind as chimeras,
fictitious being and being of thought
(chimera, ens fictum et ens
rationis) are not
being according to
its definition. Chimeras cannot
be at all, because their nature
embraces a contradiction. Fictitious beings cannot be known clear and distinct
so they cannot be found as being.
Beings of thought or mental beings outside the mind are pure nothing. They are
real entities only as the modes of
thinking (modi cogitandi). Spinoza clear
says that mental
beings "inservit ad
res intellectas facilius
retinendas, explicandas atque
imaginandas".4) These modes
of thinking have no real object
(ideatum). From this it is clear
that their being
is constituted by
the modal differenciation of
thinking thing (res cogitans). Therefore there is no possibility to cross the
limits of our mind with assistance of these mental beings.
If
we had only such mental
beings in our
mind, our situation would be very odd. We could say nothing valid about
the external world. We would be
closed in our mental world and our knowledge would have to do only with
our mind and its content.
Nevertheless it is not like this
! Taking it all in all we say anyhow
about the external world. Even
we have the adequate ideas and the adequate ideas are true ideas. But what is a true idea ? It is capable of being understood through itself.5) Then we know
truth. This certainly
does not depend
on the establishment of
relations between ideas
and things and the determination
of the precise nature of such relations, the test of validity of an idea is not in the correspondence of the idea and the thing.6) However where from do we know truth ? Does it come out of externality ? It seems no ! Spinoza in
according with Descartes presumes that
"nam ens quatenus
ens est per
se solum ... nos non
affficit."7) Thus how and where from can we know truth ?
There is at
least one way how to answer this question. We must
realize that truth, as Spinoza says, "makes itself
manifest".8) So we must truth
descry or discern, i.e. to realize it. Such
realizing is necessary for our mind
because descrying of truth is a
promise for our finding of something as
actual or real being. Although mental beings are only modes of thinking, i.e. they are not actual or real
being, even they are not-being, to have true knowledge is to possess true or adequate ideas. From
this reason Spinoza repudiates the
division of being into real entities
and mental entities as a bad
division. Being is not common kind of
real and mental entities. Real
entities distinguish from mental entities as being from not-being.
It is necessary to return
to our ability of clear and distinct knowledge again, because
this ability connects very tightly
with our possession of true ideas or
with our ability of having truth. We
are able not only to know clear and distinct, but we also know
about it. In
his Ethics Spinoza
writes unambiguous: "For, indeed, the idea of the mind, that is to say, the idea of
the idea, is nothing but the form
of the idea in so far as this
is considered as a
mode of thought and without relation to the object, just as a person who knows anything, by that very fact knows
that he knows, and knows that he knows
that he knows and so ad infinitum."9)
Our mind is able to reflect its acts and this ability belongs to
the nature of our mind. Upon this
depends the real
possibility of self-knowledge and self-understanding.
What means it ? I suppose
that it is very important fact. Human mind is real being which is not
only set of its modes, but
it is being in full-value
sense. Therefore understanding to motion and structure of mind means to
understand to "structure of being", i.e. to realize truth.
Yet to achieve it is very difficult for everyone. Often we grope around and
misbelieve. By thinking
about the things of external world we do not distinguish between the true ideas and other mental beings. In spite
of the fact that we have no reason for it, we
conceive many fictitious
ideas as ideas of things outside the mind. Their real nature, i.e. only mental being, keeps
hidden for us. Therefore, unless the philosophers, thinkers and other understood this real nature, so many philosophical or metaphysical
conceptions were mistaken and their
authors worried with many "dark
places" (circa obscuriora). For
the advance in metaphysical philosophy these problems must be
enlighted. From this reason Spinoza
pays attention to this problem
in the first part of Metaphysical Thought. What are the results of his
effort?
The reason, for Spinoza, is a producer or maker (in latin language "repertor" -
see the verb
"reperire") of being receptived as an extramental existence. Though they
are receptived as real beings, a
lot of them have the nature
of mental beings (may be said
"quasi-beings") whose
maker is our own mind. Accordingly with the definition real being is
only what exists necessary or at least is able to exist. At once real being demonstrate the action
and structure of Being in the
supreme sense - i.e.
the God. Our
mind as the source of clear and distinct knowledge
(clare et distincte cognoscere) is
being in a very real sense. It must,
therefore, demonstrate the action and the
structure of the God, which is the "creator" or "producer" ("maker") of all
forms of being included the human
mind. The actual essence (or
nature) of God is the absolute
matter of all what is real and immediately of all what is a mode of real being.
Briefly said: Our reason finds being as
being and so it touches "to
be" of being. From this it follows that our reason meets with it in what
is being as being. In this
meeting our reason is knowing in
what being is constituted. Both
forms of being (mind and something)
collaborate in this way and the results of their collaboration are the knowledges of being. So being is found as being which is known clear and
distinct in the human sense.
The
hidden truth of
being gets understandable for us. Spinoza
demonstrates this in his
conception of real division of being in
second part of
Metaphysical Thought.10) The
true division of being is into
being which necessarily
exists, or whose essence necessarily involves existence, and being
whose essence does not involve
existence except in possibility. Dutch philosopher
used the older philosophical concepts
of essence and existence for more exact expression. The first kind of being stated by Spinoza as the substance
is such being whose essence involves existence. The second kind of being named by Spinoza modus is such
being whose essence does not involve existence. Consequently
thought the difference between the essence and the existence is possible and
understandable only by so called modal being,
i.e. by modus. In the case of
substance this difference has no meaning.
Let’s ask again: What sense
has Spinoza’s conception of being
? This problem I attempted to catch by thesis about the God and the human mind as the "creators of being". Also I attempted to give the
reasons of this statement, from which it follows that for Spinoza being is the
substance or the modus. What beings are
the God and the human minds ? In the
case of an individual human mind there
is no problem, because it is
able to exist, but its existence is not
necessary. A human mind, therefore, is only modal being, i.e. modus. It seems doubtless. However it is
not so simple. There are a host
of difficulties in
understanding of human mind. We
must mention at least one. It
was pointed out above that
something is hidden in the
human mind, upon which depends
our ability of clear and distinct
knowledge and also our ability of knowing
and understanding ourself.
(It is very important that
human power of transcendence is based on these abilities !) Our
mind is able to understand itself
and so it is able to
understand the substance, of which
is modal form of being, i.e.
the God. By virtue of these abilities our mind has, as Spinoza says11),
the own eternal part.
In the case of absolute being, i.e. Being as God, it could seem that the
problem is simple enough. The God is identical with the substance. Some of
Spinoza’s propositions, demonstrations and notes in his Ethics verifies this
supposition.12) In my opinion but
it is misleading. I consider that the spinozistic God is identical
and also not-identical with the substance. In the first case the
God a the substance are
beings whose the essence involves
the existence. Therefore they
exist from the necessity of their
own nature alone.
The God, however,
is not only necessary being, but
also He is the fullness of being. He must be more than substance because
He is the supreme reality. This conclusion may be demonstrated by lot of Spinoza’s propositions from his works
and correspondence.13) Here
I restrict only on brief notes from
Metaphysical Thought. The
first paragraph of second part contains
following statements14): "1. Deumn eminenter continere id quod formaliter
in rebus creatis reperitur, hoc
est, Deum talia attributa habere, quibus omnia creata eminentiori modo contineantur. 2. Deum se
ipsum atque omnia alia intelligere, hoc est, omnia obiective etiam
in se habere. 3. Deum esse omnium rerum causam eumque ex absoluta
libertate voluntatis operari." (Marginal
note: The third
point has somewhat
non-spinozistic character. In this case, however, our attention must be turned
to Spinoza’s main work
Ethics. In the
first book15) Spinoza demonstrates that will of God
is identical with His reason and
both are not by any
means similar with
the human will and reason.)
The first and second points are very important. Here it is avouched:
The God is the cause of all what can either be or be conceived. Does it mean that the God as the
absolutely infinite Being is one and the same as the substance ? I do not
assume that it is so, because I think that the
God is not the same as all of beings. Why ? In my opinion following proposition is valid:
"The God is all, but all is not the God."16) I will try to explain.
The God is all in the same sense as the
substance, which is the substance
of all its modes. Thus the God
is all being, because beings,
for Spinoza, are
either substance or modus. Nevertheless
from this it does not follow that all being is the God. By
Spinoza the God
is defined as
a being absolutely infinite, i.e. being
in the supreme sense or by
another name being as the
fullness of "to be". He is
the absolute Being (ens absolutum). And
such Being is inexhaustible and in the extreme perfect. He is out of time and space, He has no form, no shape, no substance. I the Spinoza’s philosophy the God acts
from the laws of His own nature only,
i.e. from His absolute power of "to be and to act". His
essence or His nature is the absolute ability to exist and to act. God’s "to be able to
be" (posse existere) and "to be able to act" (posse agere) beats everything of being. The
God is so in excess of the substance and its modes.
If we
conceive and understand this
God’s nature, we know truth. In knowing
truth we can understand the sense. This
is the way of wise
man (homo sapiens)17). Spinoza calls this understanding "intelectual love to
God" in the fifth book
of Ethics. It is love which consists in "the intuitive knowledge" (scientia intuitiva)18) as the source of true life of man, to which is
aimed whole Spinoza’s
philosophy and then also his conception
of being.
Notes:
1) Benedicti
de Spinoza Opera
quae supersunt omnia, ed.C.H.Bruder, vol.I, Lipsiae 1843, p.99
2)
ibid.
3)
ibid., p.100
4)
ibid.
5)
See A.Balz: Idea and Essence in the Philosophies of Hobbes and Spinoza, Columbia
University Press New
York 1918, p.40 and following.
6)
See The Ethics of Spinoza, transl.W.H.Write, Great Books of the Western World, vol.31,
University of Chicago 1952, p.373.
7)
See R.Descartes: Principia philosophiae, I, ő 52.
8)
A.Balz: cited work, p.41
9)
The Ethics of Spinoza, cited edition, p.383
10) Benedicti
de Spinoza Opera
quae supersunt omnia, ed.C.H.Bruder, vol.I, p.104 and
following.
11)
The Ethics of Spinoza, cited edition, p.458
12)
See for example propositions 11, 14 and other in the first book of Ethics.
13)
See M.Hemelik: De Deo (The problem of God in the Spinoza’s philosophy), Palackě’s University of Olomouc 1995
14)
Ben.de Spinoza Opera ... , ed.C.H.Bruder, vol.I, p.104
15)
The Ethics of Spinoza, cit.ed., p.367
16)
This sentence originates in the jewish cabbalistic tradition.
17) The
Ethics of Spinoza, cit.ed., p.463 18)
ibid., p.388
Hrusice 17.9.1998 (c) Martin Hemelik